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In this article, I carry out a compara-
tive analysis of population change in the 
bordering regions of Russia and the Eu-
ropean Union. Peripheries of their coun-
tries, most of these regions enjoy a more 
or less favourable demographic situation, 
which, however, differs from place to pla-
ce. To attain the aims of the study, I ana-
lyse official data from Russian and EU 
statistical offices and map the results ob-
tained. I identify significant differences 
between border regions and cities. The 
most adverse demographic situation is ob-
served in the borderlands of the Baltics, a 
slightly better one in Poland and Finland. 
As to Russia’s border regions, a popula-
tion increase is characteristic of Saint Pe-
tersburg and the Leningrad and Kalinin-
grad regions. Yet, a number of cities in 
the immediate vicinity of the border face a 
population decline. The demographic si-
tuation could be improved by more active 
transboundary collaborations and by the 
border serving increasingly as a contact 
area rather than a barrier. 
 
Keywords: demographic situation, bor-
der regions, border cities, Russia, Baltics, 
Poland, Finland 
 
Introduction 
 
The end of the 20th century be-
came a watershed that dramatically 
changed the course of economic and 
demographic development of the for-
mer socialist countries of Eastern Eu-
rope. This also holds true for regions 
that became borderlands after the de-
mise of the Soviet Union. These re-
gions had two options — either to turn 
into periphery or into territories, the 
development of which is boosted by 
transboundary cooperation. Neighbours 
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of Eastern European states, having traditional market economy, wit-
nessed the improvement of the economic and geographical position of 
former socialist countries, as frontiers turned into a contact area rather 
than a barrier. The westernmost territories of Eastern European coun-
tries and their Western neighbours became more involved in trans-
boundary economic cooperation. The accession to the EU of some for-
mer socialist countries and ex-USSR republics gave their residents an 
opportunity to migrate to more developed EU countries in search of a 
better-paid job and higher living standards. These countries too faced an 
influx of migrants from less economically developed ‘third world’ states, 
although they were not affected as much as their richer western neigh-
bours were. 
Russia borders on five EU member states. All Russia’s borderlands 
with the EU lie within the Baltic macroregion. Recently, Russian resear-
chers have paid special attention to demographic problems. Typological 
distinctions between regions have been identified and analysed [1]. 
A comparative analysis of the demographic situation in Russia and its 
regions, on the one hand, and in the neighbouring countries and their re-
gions, on the other, is still a rare find. However, the Baltic Sea region, which 
includes Russia’s North-West, is a popular object of research [2—8]. 
A number of studies have focused on the regional dimension of demogra-
phic development in the CIS countries [9—10] and the Barents Region 
[11]. In this article, I juxtapose the demographic performance of the neigh-
bouring regions of Russia and the EU and estimate the potential and rele-
vance of transboundary cooperation. 
Among Russia’s EU neighbours, Finland is a country with a tradi-
tional market economy, Poland is a former socialist state, and Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia are ex-USSR republics. The former socialist states 
treading the path of market development, the accession of Poland and the 
Baltics to NATO and the EU, and Finland’s accession to the European 
Union changed the character of the border between the Russian Federa-
tion and the above countries after the disintegration of the USSR. How-
ever, this border is still less transparent than that between the EU member 
states [12]. In this article, I analyse previously published statistical data 
to consider how (and if) the changes in the geopolitical position of re-
gions on either side of Russia’s border with the five EU countries affect-
ed the demographic processes and structures on these territories. I also 
explore differences in the demographic processes and the development of 
the geodemographic situation in the said border regions. My analysis is to 
demonstrate whether the concept of polarisation is applicable to the terri-
tory in question, namely, how border regions (which some researchers 
class as periphery [13—15]) develop in comparison with other regions of 
Russia and the neighbouring EU countries. 
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Methods 
 
In this article, I examine the demographic situation in the border re-
gions of Russia and the EU. Since the principles behind the subdivision 
of Russia and the EU member states do not match completely, my analy-
sis will focus on Russian regions, on the one hand, and NUTS 3 units, on 
the other. I hold that these subdivisions stand in a close, although not ex-
act, correspondence. 
The study employs statistical data on population change (in 1950—
2018 at the national and in 1990—2017 at the regional level), population 
growth, natural increase, net migration, and crude birth and mortality 
rates (2016). The regional demographic situation is analysed, among oth-
er things, in the context of national trends. I employ a number of methods 
of economic and statistical analysis — grouping, graph analysis, typolo-
gy — and carry out the mapping of the results obtained. 
I use statistical data from Rosstat1 (for Russia and its regions) and 
those from Eurostat and national statistics handbooks.2 
 
Population change in Russia and the neighbouring EU countries 
 
As complex phenomena, the dynamics of population change mirror 
the state of economy and society [16]. Studying these dynamics is crucial 
for understanding the characteristics of the demographic situation and 
assessing the progress of economic and social processes in countries and 
regions. It has been stressed that population decline is not an easily re-
versible process [17]. Coupled with an economic downturn, population 
decline becomes a link in the chain of negative phenomena (a reduction 
in tax revenues, degrading infrastructure and social services, etc.) that 
force people to leave. At the same time, comparative studies into the de-
velopment of European countries pay special attention to their economic 
development and changes in living standards [18—21]. I build on the as-
sumption that demographic changes have a similar effect and the new 
                                                     
1 Demography // Federal State Statistics Service. URL: http://www.gks.ru/wps/ 
wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/# (аcces-
sed 12.05. 2018). 
2 Eurostat. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (аccessed 10.05.2018) ; Kalinin-
gradstat. URL: http://kaliningrad.gks.ru (accessed 22.06.2018) ; Central Statisti-
cal Bureau of Latvia. URL: http://www.csb.gov.lv/en (accessed 08.06.2018) ; 
Statistics Estonia. URL: https://www.stat.ee/en (accessed 08.06.2018) ; Statistics 
Finland. URL: https://www.stat.fi/index_en.html (accessed 08.06.2018) ; Statis-
tics Lithuania. URL: https://www.stat.gov.lt/en (accessed 08.06.2018) ; Statis-
tics Poland. URL: http://stat.gov.pl/en/ (accessed 08.06.2018). 
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demographic situation in the east of Europe does not only influence the 
economic development but also plays a significant role in the changes in 
living standards and even civilizational values. 
The most complicated situation is observed in the Baltics, where a 
steep reduction in the already low birth rate and massive emigration (for 
instance, in Lithuania and Latvia), observed from the early 1990s, result 
in a rapid population decline [22]. The population of Estonia is approxi-
mately half of that of the Leningrad region and it might soon become 
smaller than that of the Kaliningrad region. In Latvia, the population fig-
ures are at the level of the early 1960s. In Russia, the rate of population 
decline is much lower. Poland’s population is growing, although at a low-
er rate than before. In Finland, which has not experienced such dramatic 
political transformations, the population growth is rather significant. 
In 2016—2017, the populations of Russia, Finland, and Poland were 
growing, although in all the three countries, the mortality rate exceeded 
the birth rate. The population growth is accounted for by immigration, 
which is rather considerable in Finland and Russia and less significant in 
Poland. In Lithuania and Latvia, the situation is less favourable because 
of the high rate of natural decline and even greater negative net migration 
(the massive emigration from these countries to richer EU states testifies 
to the centre-periphery relations in today’s Europe [23]). In Estonia, the 
rate of natural decline was lower and net migration was slightly positive. 
However, the latter could not make up for a high mortality rate, which 
translates into population decline, just as in the case of the two other Bal-
tic States. Thus, based on the characteristics and sources of population 
change, countries of the Baltic region can be divided into two groups. 
The first one, bringing together Russia, Poland, and Finland is character-
ised by better demographic performance (note that, in Russia, the birth 
rate is higher than in the other two countries, although the mortality rate 
is more considerable too). The other group, comprising Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia, demonstrates poor demographic performance characterised 
by a low birth and a high mortality rate, particularly, in the two former 
states. 
 
Population change in the border regions of Russia and the EU 
 
Overall, the demographic performance of the studied regions is below 
the respective national averages. In 1990—2016, the population of the 
border region as a proportion of the national total decreased everywhere 
with the exception of Poland. The most dramatic reduction was observed 
in the countries where borderlands are home to from 1/5 to 1/3 of the na-
tional population (fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1. Changes in the population of border regions as a proportion  
of the national total, 1990—2016 
 
However, the demographic development of the border regions is ir-
regular. Below, I will consider this thesis in detail. 
 
The Russian Federation 
 
Russia’s territories bordering on the EU are the Republic of Karelia 
and the Murmansk, Leningrad, Pskov, and the Kaliningrad regions. They 
have slight demographic differences. Some of them, classed as ‘interna-
tional development corridors’3 [24; 25] (the Leningrad and the Kalinin-
grad regions) are characterised by better socioeconomic and demographic 
                                                     
3 The concept of ‘international development corridors’ [24; 25] is a continuation 
of the idea first outlined by George Friedman, who defined ‘development corri-
dors’ as regions that, sandwiched between ‘core’ regions, take advantage of their 
geographical position to the benefit of their economies [26]. ‘International de-
velopment corridors’ — unlike their inland counterparts — lie between the 
‘core’ regions of two or more states. They can cater for international trade, inte-
grate into common value added chains, and borrow innovations from the ‘core’ 
regions of two or more countries. 
Demography 
46 
performance. In the others — the depressed Republic of Karelia and the 
Murmansk and Pskov regions, — the demographic situation has been 
highly unfavourable throughout the post-Soviet period. The high rates of 
migration from the regions testify to this fact. In the former regions, the 
population is growing, in the latter, declining (fig. 2). However, in the 
Leningrad region — despite the overall positive trend, towns situated im-
mediately at the border with Estonia are losing population [27]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Dynamics of population change in Russia’s regions bordering  
on the EU, 2018 (as of the beginning of the year) 
 
A source of population in the emerging ‘international development 
corridors’ is net migration (fig. 3). In the Northern areas — Karelia and 
the Murmansk region — it is negative, whereas, in the Pskov region, it is 
slightly above zero. 
The rate of natural increase is close to zero in the Kaliningrad and 
negative in the Leningrad region. However, the high rate of natural de-
cline reflected in the regional statistics is explained by that part of birth 
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records pertaining to the Leningrad region is made in Saint Petersburg. 
This is why the region’s birth rate is the lowest among the five territories 
under consideration. In the other three regions — the Republic of Karelia 
and the Murmansk and Pskov regions — the population is declining. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The rate of natural increase, net migration,  
and the total population growth rate in Russia’s regions bordering  
on the EU member states, 2016 
 
The EU member states 
 
The sources of, and differences in, the population change dynamics 
observed across the EU regions bordering on Russia are rather similar to 
those described above. In terms of demography, there are pronounced 
‘growth poles’ — international ‘development corridors’ — and depressed 
periphery. The Gdansk area, where rapid population growth is explained 
by the city being part of the Tricity agglomeration, is an ‘international 
development corridor’, similar to Russia’s Leningrad and the Kaliningrad 
region. The Gdansk area is different from its counterparts: the significant 
growth of its population is almost equally a result of positive net migra-
tion and a high rate of natural increase, with a birth rate reaching 13.3 per 
1000 population (2016) and a mortality rate as low as 7.5. This relates to 
a ‘younger’ age structure of the population, explained by a considerable 
influx of immigrants. 
A slightly lower growth rate is observed in Finland’s Northern Ostro-
bothnia, where growth is sustained by a high rate of natural increase ex-
plained, in turn, by a considerable birth rate. In the other regions of the 
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five countries, the population has been declining since 1995 (fig. 4, 5). 
Similarly to their Russia’s counterparts, Finland’s northern regions (fig. 4) 
are losing population. The most rapid decline is associated with the Bal-
tics’ regions bordering on Russia (fig. 5). Out of the seven territories, on-
ly the Klaipėda County is losing population at a rate below the national 
average, which can be explained by its functioning as an ‘international 
development corridor’. A rapid population decline is observed across all 
Latvia’s municipalities lying at a considerable distance from the capital 
[28]. However, in the Russian regions, this process is less pronounced. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Population change in Poland’s and Finland’s regions, 1990—2017, 
% of the 1990 level 
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Fig. 5. Population change in the Baltics’ regions, 1990—2017, 
% of the 1990 level 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 and 7 show the correlation between the natural increase and net 
migration as components of population change in the regions under con-
sideration. In Poland, among the regions sharing a border with Russia, 
only the Gdansk area had positive net migration in 2016. In Finland, net 
migration was positive only in South Karelia — home to the rapidly de-
veloping city of Lappeenranta. Note that both countries are characterised 
by slightly positive net migration. In the Baltics, all the regions bordering 
on Russia were characterised by negative net migration. 
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Fig. 6. The rate of natural increase, net migration,  
and the total population growth rate in Poland’ s  
and Finland’s regions bordering on Russia, 2016 
 
Source: [10]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. The rate of natural increase, net migration, and the total population  
growth rate in the Baltics’ regions bordering on Russia, 2016 
 
Source: [10]. 
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A comparison of population change in the bordering regions  
of Russia and the EU 
 
A juxtaposition of the total growth, the rate of natural increase, and 
net migration per 1000 population in the borderlands with the respective 
national averages shows the following. Firstly, among the Russian terri-
tories, only the Kaliningrad region, despite its exclave position, performs 
above the national average in terms of three measures (although the high 
rate of natural increase is explained not by a high total fertility rate, 
which is below the national average, but by a high proportion of popula-
tion aged 18—30). In the Leningrad region, the values of two measures 
are above the national average, whereas the rate of natural decline is 
greater than that. The only above-the-average measure in Karelia is the 
rate of natural increase. However, just as in the Kaliningrad region, it 
owes to the age structure of the local population. 
The demographic performance of the EU’s border regions seems even 
poorer as against the respective national averages. In Poland, only the 
Gdansk area performs above the national average in terms of three 
measures. In all the other three regions, the values of all the three 
measures are below the national average. In Finland, only one of the six 
regions — Northern Ostrobothnia — demonstrates above-the-average 
performance in terms of one demographic measure (the rate of natural 
increase). In Lithuania, the values of all the three measures are slightly 
above the national average in the Klaipėda County. In the other two 
counties, all of them are below the national average. The demographic 
performance is below the national average in both Latvian and both Esto-
nian regions. 
The above testifies to the fact that the three border areas classed as 
‘international development corridors’, the Kaliningrad and Leningrad re-
gions and the Gdansk area, stand out among the other territories, which 
seem to be depressed in both demographic and economic terms. This fits 
the core-periphery concept. The Klaipėda County exhibits some features 
of a ‘development corridor’. However, its potential is limited by the 
small size of Lithuania’s economy. Therefore, most of the regions under 
consideration share a border that serves more as a barrier than as a con-
tact zone. The ‘development corridor’ regions are no exception, since 
their rapid development has little to do with their transboundary ties. 
They are home to large port facilities catering for the transit ties of their 
countries or of large hinterlands. 
Fig. 8 shows a geographical juxtaposition of the population change 
measures of Russia’s and the EU’s neighbouring regions. All the Russian 
regions perform better than their Polish and Baltic neighbours, the only 
exception being the Gdansk area, where the total population growth rate 
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and the rate of natural increase are higher than they are in the Kaliningrad 
region (although net migration is below the Kaliningrad level). The corre-
lation between Russia’s and Finland’s regions is not as straightforward. 
In some Finnish border areas, the situation is better than in their Russian 
counterparts (especially in the north, in North Karelia, Northern Ostro-
bothnia, and Lapland), in the others it is worse (particularly, in Kainuu). 
 
Finland 
FI1D3 North Karelia 
FI1D4 Kainuu 
FI1D6 Northern Ostrobothnia 
FI1D7 Lapland 
FI1D5 Kymenlaakso 
 
Estonia 
EE008 South Estonia 
EE 007 North-East Estonia 
 
Latvia 
LV 005 Latgale 
LV 008 Videzeme 
 
Lithuania 
LT 003 Klaipėda County 
LT 004 Marijampolė County 
LT 007 Tauragė County 
 
Poland 
PL 633 Gdansk 
PL 621 Elbląg 
PL 622 Olsztyn 
PL 623 Ełk 
 
Fig. 8. A comparison of the natural change dynamics  
in the neighbouring regions of Russia and the EU 
 
At the border with the Leningrad region — an area of relatively ac-
tive transboundary cooperation, the demographic performance is below 
Finland’s average. The population is growing virtually only in the city of 
Lappeenranta situated close to the border. This is partly explained by 
Russia-speaking Ingrian Finns emigrating from Russia. It has been re-
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ported that the city has a large proportion of the Russophones.4 However, 
the border city of Imatra, which is also located in South Karelia, as well 
as the region in general are losing population. As to the Russian border 
cities, which are connected by transport routes with Lappeenranta and 
Imatra and make transboundary pairs with them (Vyborg — Lappeenran-
ta and Svetogorsk — Imatra), their population has been stable since the 
2000s after a steep decline observed in the 1990 (see Table). 
 
Population change in the neighbouring regions of Russia and the EU ⃰ 
 
 
Population, thousand people, 
2017, as of the beginning  
of the year 
Population change, annual average, % 
1979—1988 1989—1999 2000—2016 
Russia — Finland 
Imatra (Finland) 28.4 0.6 -3.7 -0.7 
Lappeenranta (Finland) 55.5 3.9 3.9 0.4 
Vyborg (RF) 78.5 3.4 -0.7 -0.1 
Svetogorsk (RF) 15.7 9.1 -0.6 0.1 
Russia — Estonia 
Narva (Estonia) 57.1 0.7 -1.5 -0.9 
Sillamäe (Estonia) 13.7 2.4 -1.6 -1.4 
Kohtla-Järve (Estonia) 35.4 -1.6 -2.4 -1.6 
Võru (Estonia) 12.4 0.4 -1.5 -1.2 
Ivangorod (RF) 10.5 1.0 0.1 -0.7 
Kingisepp (RF) 45.3 2.5 0.4 -0.6 
Pechory (RF) 10.0 1.9 1.4 -2.1 
Russia — Latvia 
Balvi (Latvia) 6.3 1.9 -0.7 -1.8 
Pytalovo (RF) 5.3 3.1 0.1 -1.8 
Russia — Lithuania 
Kybartai (Lithuania) 4.8 0.3 -0.7 -1.9 
Šilutė (Lithuania) 15.9 2.6 0.1 -1.7 
Neringa (Lithuania) 3.1 1.1 -0.3 1.6 
Nesterov (RF) 4.1 0.2 0.4 -1.3 
Sovetsk (RF) 40.5 0.4 0.3 -0.3 
Zelengradsk (RF) 15.5 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Russia — Poland 
Bartoszyce (Poland) 23.8 1.8 0.0 -0.2 
Kętrzyn (Poland)  27.5 1.2 -0.5 -0.1 
Bagrationovsk (RF) 6.4 1.1 0.7 -1.2 
Chernyakhovsk (RF) 36.4 1.1 1.1 -2.0 
 
⃰ Calculated by the author based on the official statistics from the RF, the EU, 
Poland, Finland, and the Baltics. 
 
As the Table slows, in 1979—1989, the population of all the cities 
situated along today’s Russia — EU border was growing. The only ex-
ception is Kohtla-Järve, the economy of which was struggling at the time 
because of the shale industry losing its once prominent position. After 
                                                     
4 Finnish cities. Lappeenranta. URL: http://da.fi/304.html (accessed June 15, 2018). 
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independence, the population of Estonian border cities has been decreas-
ing twice as rapidly as across the country due to the emigration of its 
Russian population. The same processes have been observed in the bor-
der cities of the other two Baltic States — with the exception of the resort 
of Neringa — in the post-Soviet period. Partly, the population decline is 
explained by the Russian population leaving the cities for Russia, particu-
larly, the neighbouring border territories. A slight population decline (be-
low the border voivodeship average) is observed in Poland’s border 
town. The neighbouring Russian towns — the only exception is the resort 
of Zelenogradsk — are also losing population, sometimes, at an even 
higher rate. For instance, Cernyakhovsk is affected by the attractiveness 
of the rapidly developing city of Kaliningrad. 
Thus, the border position of the neighbouring Russian and EU cities 
and towns seems to play a negative role in their development. The excep-
tions are few. Only Finland’s Lappeenranta and the Polish towns have 
taken advantage of transboundary ties by developing transboundary trade 
and producing semi-finished goods imported by Kaliningrad companies. 
The performance of the resorts of Zelenogradsk and Neringa has little to 
do with their border position. In the other cases, the negative effect on the 
development of border cities is associated with their periphery position. 
 
Conclusions 
 
There are considerable differences in the population change dynamics 
in the neighbouring border regions of the Russian Federation and the Eu-
ropean Union. A major negative factor is a significant rate of natural de-
cline and negative net migration in the Baltics’ regions, across which the 
differences are also significant. The smallest demographic losses are as-
sociated with South Estonia. The most favourable situation is observed in 
Russia’s Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions, Poland’s Gdansk area, and 
Finland’s Northern Ostrobothnia. 
The performance of all the Baltics’ regions pales in comparison with 
that of the Leningrad and the Kaliningrad region. However, the Pskov 
region is quite comparable with South Estonia, although its situation is 
much better than that observed in the other neighbouring territories of 
Latvia and Estonia. With the exception of Gdansk, the situation in Po-
land’s border regions is also worse than in the Kaliningrad region. This 
can be explained by a negative net migration in the Polish borderlands 
and a positive one in the Kaliningrad region. However, the difference in 
the rate of natural increase is insignificant. The performance of Finland’s 
and Russia’s cities is comparable. A rapid population growth is observed 
in the Leningrad region and a slow one in Finland’s Northern Ostroboth-
nia. The other neighbouring regions are gradually losing population due 
to both natural decline and negative net migration. 
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When examining border regions, particularly from the perspective of 
their demographic potential, it is important to consider their considerable 
differentiation. Most of them — as the polarisation concept suggests — 
are depressed. However, some of them turn into ‘international growth 
poles’ that can forge strong transboundary ties. In the others, an interna-
tional neighbourhood can mitigate the periphery factor and give an impe-
tus to socioeconomic and demographic development. 
 
Acknowledgements 
This study was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation 
(project No. 18-17-00112 ‘Ensuring the economic security of the regions of Rus-
sia’s western borderlands amid geopolitical turbulence’). 
 
References 
 
1. Fedorov, G. 2014, The Concept of Geo-Demographic Situation and Geo-
Demographic Typology of the Subjects of the Russian Federation, Bulletin of 
Geography, 25(25), 101—114. doi: 10.2478/bog-2014-0032. 
2. Biermann, U., Stiller, S. 2013, Migration in the Baltic Sea Region in the 
Context of Demographic Change, Journal of East-West Business, Vol. 19, no. 
1—2, p. 105—121. 
3. Hanell, T. 1998, Facts in Figures: The Baltic States and Northwest Rus-
sia at a Glance, North, Vol. 9, no. 2—3, p. 10—16. 
4. Kolosov, V. A. 2016, Cross-border Regionalization and Frontal Migra-
tion: European Experience for Russia? Regional'nye Issledovaniya [Regional 
Research], no. 3, p. 83—93 (in Russ.). 
5. Kuznetsova, T. Yu. 2013, Tendencies and Factors of Demographic De-
velopment in the Baltic Region: Regional Analysis, Regional'nye Issledovaniya 
[Regional research], no. 3, p. 50—57 (in Russ.). 
6. Mkrtchyan, N., Karachurina, L. 2014, The Baltics and Russian North-
West: the Core and the Periphery in the 2000s, Balt. Reg., no. 2, p. 48—62. doi: 
10.5922/2079-8555-2014-2-4. 
7. Thoborg, M. 2002, Population Around the Baltic Sea, In: Maciejew-
ski, W. (ed.) The Baltic Sea Region. Cultures, Politics, Societies, Uppsala, 
p. 495—509. 
8. Fedorov, G. M., Mikhailov, A. S., Kuznetsova, T. Yu. 2017, The Influ-
ence of the Sea on the Economic Development and Settlement Structure in the 
Baltic Sea region, Balt. Reg., Vol. 9, no. 2, p. 4—18. doi: 10.5922/2079-8555- 
2017-2-1. 
9. Karachurina, L., Mkrtchyan, N. 2015, Population Change in the Regional 
Centres and Internal Periphery of the Regions in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
over the Period of 1990—2000s, Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series, 
no. 28, p. 91—111. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bog-2015-0018. 
10. Nefedova, T. G., Slepukhina, I. L., Brade, I. 2016, Migration Attractive-
ness of Cities in the Post-Soviet Space: A Case Study of Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus, Reg. Res. Russ, no. 6, p. 131—143. doi: https://doi.org/10.1134/ 
S2079970516020088. 
Demography 
56 
11. Emelyanova, A., Rautio, A. 2016, Population Diversification in De-
mographics, Health, and Living Environments: the Barents Region in Review. 
In: Lankila, T., Tervo-Kankare, K. (eds.) NGP Yearbook 2016: Geographies of 
Well-Being in the North, Finland, p. 3—18. 
12. Zupančič, J. Wendt, J. A. Ilieş, A., An Outline of Border Changes in the 
Area between the Baltic and the Mediterranean: their Geopolitical Implications 
and Classification, Geographia Polonica. Vol. 91, no. 1, p. 33—46. doi: https:// 
doi.org/10.7163/GPol.0104. 
13. Mikhaylov, A. S., Mikhaylova, A. A., Kuznetsova, T. Yu. 2018, Coasta-
lization Effect and Spatial Divergence: Segregation of European regions, Ocean 
and Coastal Management, Vol. 161, p. 57—65. 
14. Komornicki, T., Czapiewski, K. Ł. 2006, Regional Periphery in Central 
and Eastern Europe, Stanisław Leszczycki Institute of Geography and Spatial 
Organization, PAS Warszawa, 234 p. 
15. Lauko, V. 2001, Postavenie pohraničnej oblasti juhozápad neho Sloven-
ska v regionálnom rozvoji SR, Miscellanea Geographica Universitatis Bohemiae 
Occidentalis, no. 9, p. 213—220. 
16. Haase, A., Bernt, M., Großmann, K., Mykhnenko, V., Rink, D. 2013, 
Varieties of Shrinkage in European Cities, European Urban and Regional Stu-
dies, Vol. 23, no. 1, p. 86—102. 
17. Hudson, R. 2015, Uneven Development, Socio-Spatial Polarization and 
Political Responses. In: Lang, T., Henn, S., Sgibnev, W., Ehrlich, K. (eds.) Un-
derstanding Geographies of Polarization and Peripheralization, London, 
p. 25—39. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137415080. 
18. Lavrinovich, I., Lavrinenko, O., Jefimovs, N. 2012, Sustainable Deve-
lopment, Economic Growth and Differentiation of Incomes of Latvian Popula-
tion, Journal of Security and Sustainability, Vol. 2, no. 1, p. 33—39. 
19. Fratesi, U., Perucca, G. 2018, Territorial Capital and the Resilience of 
European Regions, The Annals of Regional Science, Vol. 60, no. 2, p. 241—264 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-017-0828-3. 
20. Lagas, P., van Dongen, F., van Rijn, F., Visser, H. 2015, Regional Qual-
ity of Living in Europe, Region, Vol. 2, no. 2, p. 1—26. doi: 10.18335/region. 
v2i2.43. 
21. Crescenzi, R., Iammarino, S. 2017, Global Investments and Regional 
Development Trajectories: The Missing Links, Regional Studies, Vol. 51, no. 1, 
p. 97—115. doi: 10.1080/00343404.2016.1262016. 
22. Ubarevičienė, R., van Ham, M. 2017, Population Decline in Lithuania: 
Who Lives in Declining Regions and Who Leaves? Regional Studies, Regional 
Science, Vol. 4, no. 1, p. 57—79. doi: 10.1080/21681376.2017.1313127. 
23. Klupt, M. A. 2015, Centre-Periphery Relations in Europe: Demographic 
Aspect, World Economy and International Relations, Vol. 59, no. 2, p. 58—67. 
24. Klemeshev, A. P., Fedorov, G. M. 2004, Ot izolirovannogo eksklava — 
k «koridoru razvitiya». Al'ternativy rossiiskogo eksklava na Baltike [From an 
Isolated Exclave — to the "Corridor of Development". Alternatives to the Rus-
sian Exclave in the Baltic], Kaliningrad, 253 p. (in Russ.). 
25. Fedorov, G. M. 2010, The Kaliningrad Dilemma: a 'Development Cor-
ridor' or a 'Double Periphery'? The Geopolitical Factor of the Development of 
the Russian Exclave on the Baltic Sea, Balt. Reg., no. 2, p. 4—12. doi: 
10.5922/2079-8555-2010-2-1. 
T. Yu. Kuznetsova 
26. Friedmann, J. 1966, Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Ve-
nezuela, MIT Press, 279 p. 
27. Zhitin, D. V., Shendrik, A. V. 2018, Population Dynamics in Towns of 
Leningrad Oblast: Effects of the Crisis of 2014—2016, Reg. Res. Russ., Vol. 8, 
no. 1, p. 46—57. doi: https://doi.org/10.1134/S2079970518010112. 
28. Nipers, A., Pilvere, I., Bulderberga, Z. 2017, Territorial Development 
Assessment in Latvia, Research for Rural Development, no. 2, p. 126—134. doi: 
10.22616/rrd.23.2017.059. 
 
The author 
 
Dr Tatyana Yu. Kuznetsova, Associate Professor, Department of Ge-
ography, Nature Management and Spatial Development, Immanuel Kant 
Baltic Federal University, Russia. 
E-mail: Tikuznetsova@kantiana.ru 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9707-5003 
 
To cite this article: 
Kuznetsova, T. Yu. 2018, Population change in the neighbouring regions of 
Russia and the European Union countries, Balt. Reg., Vol. 10, no. 3, p. 41—57. 
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2018-3-3. 
 
